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Abstract  
One of the major challenges facing the 
integration of Unmanned Aircraft Systems 
(UAS)  in the National Airspace System (NAS) is 
the lack of an onboard pilot that can comply 
with the legal requirement identified in the US 
Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) that pilots 
see and avoid other aircraft. UAS will be 
expected to demonstrate the means to perform 
the function of see and avoid while preserving 
the safety level of the airspace and the efficiency 
of the air traffic system. This paper introduces a 
Sense and Avoid (SAA) concept for integration 
of UAS into the NAS that is currently being 
developed by the National Aeronautics and 
Space Administration (NASA) and identifies 
areas that require additional experimental 
evaluation to further inform various elements of 
the concept. The concept design rests on 
interoperability principles that take into account 
both the Air Traffic Control (ATC) environment 
as well as existing systems such as the Traffic 
Alert and Collision Avoidance System (TCAS). 
Specifically, the concept addresses the 
determination of well clear values that are large 
enough to avoid issuance of TCAS corrective 
Resolution Advisories, undue concern by pilots 
of proximate aircraft and issuance of controller 
traffic alerts. The concept also addresses 
appropriate declaration times for projected 
losses of well clear conditions and maneuvers to 
regain well clear separation. 
 
 
 
1   Introduction  
The Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) 
Integration in the National Airspace System 
(NAS) project is a research effort funded by the 
National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
(NASA) that addresses the development and 
integration of concepts and technologies to 
facilitate public and civil UAS in non-
segregated airspace operations. The desire to 
utilize unmanned aircraft to perform national 
security, defense, scientific, emergency 
management, and many civil applications is 
driving the critical need for UAS to have less 
restrictive access to the NAS. Access to the 
NAS is hampered by challenges such as the lack 
of an on-board pilot to see and avoid other 
aircraft, the lack of protected civil radio 
frequency spectrum and reliable infrastructure 
for command and control links, and the wide 
variation in UAS size, performance (altitudes, 
speeds, and maneuvering performance) and 
missions. The Federal Aviation Administration 
(FAA) has established a process enabling public 
agencies to request a Certificate of 
Authorization or Waiver (COA) to operate UAS 
in the NAS. The COA process is resource 
intensive and lengthy; additionally, COAs are 
restrictive and often lack the flexibility to meet 
the needs of the entire mission. In order for 
UAS to integrate seamlessly in the NAS, major 
technical and regulatory challenges must be 
resolved. Although some of the abovementioned 
characteristics are not unique to UAS, the 
number of aircraft that possess them is expected 
to increase because UAS will be able to fulfill 
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so many new roles. A large number of these 
types of operations may impact the efficiency of 
all aircraft operations as well as the entire 
airspace by inducing additional delays or 
increasing air traffic control workload. 
The UAS in the NAS project is addressing 
a number of the technical challenges such as 
ensuring robust and secure communications 
technologies and solving the constraints of 
frequency spectrum allocation, developing 
robust human systems integration and standards, 
defining airworthiness and certification 
standards for a wide range of UAS vehicle types 
and assessing the impact of “sense and avoid” 
equipped unmanned aircraft (UA) on both the 
airspace system and the air traffic control (ATC) 
environment. This paper focuses on the sense 
and avoid interoperability challenge. 
The lack of an onboard pilot is clearly the 
most obvious difference between UAS and 
traditional aircraft and it is this difference that 
drives the problem of how to deal with the legal 
requirement identified in the US Code of 
Federal Regulations (CFR) that pilots see and 
avoid other aircraft. As a means of compliance 
with the regulatory requirements to see and 
avoid the final report of the FAA sponsored 
Sense and Avoid (SAA) Workshop [1] defines 
SAA as “the capability of a UAS to remain well 
clear from and avoid collisions with other 
airborne traffic. SAA provides the intended 
functions of self separation and collision 
avoidance compatible with expected behavior of 
aircraft operating in the airspace system.” 
Future SAA systems will provide UA pilots 
with some level of surveillance information 
about aircraft near the UA and enable the pilot 
to execute approved procedures for maintaining 
safe separation (“well clear”) from other aircraft 
with or without controller coordination. 
This paper introduces a SAA concept for 
integration of UAS into the NAS that is 
currently being developed by NASA and 
identifies areas that require additional 
experimental evaluation to further inform 
various elements of the concept. The concept 
design rests on interoperability principles that 
take into account both the ATC environment as 
well as existing systems such as the Traffic 
Alert and Collision Avoidance System (TCAS). 
The rest of the paper is organized as 
follows: Section 2 provides a high level 
description of a concept for integration of SAA-
equipped UAS operations and introduces basic 
SAA terminology and concepts needed to 
describe the new proposed implementation.  
Section 3 further describes the new SAA 
implementation concept as well as the rationale 
and design principles on which the concept is 
based. Section 4 provides concluding remarks. 
2    SAA Concept of Integration for UAS 
NAS Operations 
This section and section 3 describe an 
implementation concept for SAA and the 
fundamental design principles that rest on the 
interoperability requirements of SAA 
functionality with the provision of air traffic 
services, and with existing TCAS equipped 
aircraft. The specific focus is on determining 
SAA capabilities required to compensate for the 
lack of an onboard pilot, and to define an 
operational concept that will enable such SAA-
equipped aircraft to smoothly integrate into an 
air traffic services environment. The concept 
builds on and extends a foundation of concepts 
described by the FAA sponsored SAA 
Workshop Final Report [1] and by various 
RTCA SC-203 documents [2, 3]. 
2.1   Overview, Assumptions and Scope 
One approach to developing and scoping an 
SAA interoperability concept is to assume that, 
from an air traffic controller or manned aircraft 
pilot’s point of view, an SAA-equipped UA 
should behave in and react to air traffic 
situations in the same or a closely-similar 
manner as if it were capable of see and avoid.  
This assumption implies not only the obvious 
general requirement of safely avoiding 
proximate aircraft, but outside of Class A 
airspace may also include the requirement to 
enable visual separation procedures.  
Controllers apply visual separation in addition 
to radar and non-radar (procedural) separation 
when providing services to aircraft outside of 
Class A airspace (i.e., below Flight Level 180 or 
 3  
CONCEPT OF INTEGRATION FOR UAS OPERATIONS IN THE NAS 
18,000 feet MSL in the U.S.) [4] and visual 
separation is needed for orderly and expeditious 
traffic flow in a visual environment.    
Controllers expect pilots to maneuver clear of 
proximate aircraft and to comply with visual 
separation instructions and clearances in a 
predictable and efficient manner. Controllers 
frequently apply visual separation with the 
instruction to “maintain visual separation” or 
even to “follow” visually-acquired traffic. It can 
therefore be argued that see and avoid (and 
potentially SAA) also serves as a mode of 
separation provision. The SAA concept 
described in this paper is designed to address 
these various see and avoid requirements. 
The concept described here assumes the 
present-day NAS communication, navigation 
and surveillance (CNS) infrastructure and ATC 
capabilities, although it does not preclude 
planned NextGen operational improvements, 
and additionally assumes that an approved and 
reliable UAS control link capability will be 
available between UAs and their respective 
Ground Control Station (GCS) sites. A means 
for the UAS operator to communicate with ATC 
will also be available, such as voice 
communications relayed through the control 
link in the present-day environment. It is also 
assumed that one or more aircraft sensor/tracker 
capabilities will be available to the UAS, either 
onboard the UA and/or from ground-based 
sources, and that these sensor/tracker data will 
be provided as inputs to sensor fusion and threat 
detection and/or resolution capabilities. ATC’s 
assumed expectations are that for normal 
operations, UAS requesting NAS access will be 
appropriately CNS-equipped and able to comply 
with the same ATC clearances and instructions 
as manned aircraft requesting the same services 
and airspace access. 
Initially, this concept would exclude very 
limited-performance aircraft or lighter-than-air 
vehicles.  This limited scope implies that the 
UA: a) would be large enough to be seen by 
other aircraft; b) would be operating under 
comparable right-of-way rules with other 
Airplane and Rotorcraft category aircraft (e.g., 
aircraft overtaking the UA must give way); and 
c) are not so performance-limited as to be 
treated as a “special case” by ATC (e.g., with 
segregated airspace and/or COA operations). 
2.2   Terms, Functions and Allocation  
The SAA Workshop Final Report [1] defined 
SAA terms, functions and sub-functions which 
are utilized in describing the concept in 
subsequent sections. The remainder of this 
subsection provides a brief description of these 
terms, functions and sub-functions (phrases in 
quotes are taken directly from reference [1]), as 
well as a description of how these sub-functions 
are allocated by the concept. 
The two functions of SAA are self 
separation (SS) and collision avoidance (CA). 
The SS function is “essential” and “could be the 
only function provided” if “the target level of 
safety can be met with SS alone”; it is intended 
as a means of compliance with the regulatory 
requirements to remain well clear of other 
aircraft, compatible with expected behavior of 
aircraft operating in the NAS. SS maneuvers 
“are expected to be normal/operational, non 
obtrusive maneuvers which will not conflict 
with accepted air traffic separation standards” 
and made “within a sufficient timeframe to 
prevent activation of a collision avoidance 
maneuver.” The maneuvers must be in 
accordance with regulations and procedures and 
compatible with TCAS II Resolution Advisories 
when maneuvering to avoid TCAS II equipped 
aircraft. The CA function engages “when all 
other modes of separation fail” and maneuvers 
are made “within a relatively short time horizon 
before closest point of approach” (CPA). 
 
 
Fig. 1. SAA Airspace Volumes 
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The SAA functions are based on a set of 
airspace volumes and thresholds surrounding 
the UA, as shown notionally in Fig. 1. The 
Collision Volume (CV) is “a cylindrical volume 
of airspace centered on the UA with a horizontal 
radius of 500 feet and vertical height of 200 feet 
(±100 feet) within which avoidance of a 
collision can only be considered a matter of 
chance.” An aircraft encounter within the CV is 
considered a Near Mid-Air Collision (NMAC). 
The CA function’s role is to prevent any aircraft 
from penetrating the CV, although it should be 
noted that an aircraft kept just outside the CV 
may still be dangerously close and could still be 
affected negatively by wake turbulence and 
other unforeseen considerations. The Collision 
Avoidance Threshold (CAT) is “the boundary 
around the UAS at which the collision 
avoidance function declares that action is 
necessary to avoid a collision and prevent the 
threat from penetrating the collision volume.” 
The CAT is not cylindrical but rather is a 
variable boundary that depends on time, 
distance, maneuverability, and other parameters. 
The Self Separation Threshold (SST) is 
also a variable boundary that depends on time, 
distance, maneuverability, and other parameters. 
Reference [1] defines the SST as “the boundary 
around the UAS at which the self separation 
function declares that action is needed to 
preclude a threat aircraft from penetrating the 
collision avoidance threshold, thereby 
maintaining self separation and keeping the 
aircraft ‘well clear’ of each other” [emphasis 
added]. The concept described in this paper 
extends the SAA Workshop’s SST and well 
clear definitions. As described further in section 
3.1, these definitions do not appear to provide 
sufficient conditions for maintaining self 
separation or well clear. 
The ATC Separation Services volume 
surrounding the aircraft represents the airspace 
where ATC separation services are provided 
and established legal standards and regulations 
apply. This volume may or may not be 
cylindrical and its size will vary, depending on 
the region of airspace and means of separation 
applied. 
The SAA functions are further divided into 
a set of sub-functions as shown in Fig. 2 and 
listed below: 
1. Detect intruder  
2. Track intruder (position & velocity) 
3. Evaluate (assess collision or self-separation 
risk) 
4. Prioritize intruder risks 
5. Declare that some action may be required 
6. Determine what action(s), if any, to take 
7. Command determined action, if any 
8. Execute commanded action 
 
 
 
The concept described in this paper 
allocates each of these functions to either 
automation or humans. There are clear 
advantages to allocating automation what it 
does best (sensing, monitoring, calculating) and 
allocating adaptive decision-making to humans 
(i.e., UA pilots, controllers), who typically do 
these functions better and more easily than does 
automation.  This allocation is also more closely 
aligned with current operations; that is, the SAA 
automation is basically “restoring intelligent 
sight” to the remote UA pilot, but leaving the 
communication and executive-level decisions 
with the pilot-in-command.  Based on that 
rationale, sub-functions 1-5 are expected to be 
performed by sensors and algorithms 
(automation), resulting in information 
elements/decision aids being provided to the 
UA pilot. Sub-functions 6 and 7 are, in normal 
conditions, performed by the UA pilot who 
evaluates information elements, queries or 
responds to ATC as necessary, and commands 
action if needed. Sub-function 8 is executed by 
UA systems. One additional sub-function, 
“return to mission” is under consideration that 
will ensure that the vehicle will efficiently 
return to its mission. 
 
Fig. 2. SAA Sub-functions 
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2.3    Sense and Avoid Concept of Use 
At an overview level, SAA systems notionally 
consist of one or more surveillance sensors, 
trackers and/or surveillance data fusion logic, 
data communications architecture (between UA 
& GCS), threat detection and/or resolution 
(TD&R) computer logic, and potentially the 
display of traffic information and/or resolution 
guidance/advice. The SAA concept of use 
described here starts with the sensing and 
tracking of aircraft within the surveillance 
volume and the provision of these intruder data 
to an onboard TD&R capability. The TD&R 
capability is able to detect situations where 
intruders have become threats – that is, they 
have violated defined self-separation and/or 
collision avoidance thresholds or are projected 
to violate them within a specified look-ahead 
time – and to compute resolution maneuvers 
intended to resolve these threat situations.  In 
normal operations the intruder and threat data, 
and recommended resolution maneuver(s), if 
any, are displayed to the UA pilot at the GCS.  
The UA pilot will consider the displayed data 
relative to the operations being conducted, 
negotiate and/or coordinate as necessary with 
ATC if receiving services from them, and then 
either command one or more UA maneuvers to 
resolve any threat situations (using either the 
TD&R-recommended maneuvers or alternate 
maneuvers negotiated with ATC) or take no 
action if the pilot determines or ATC 
coordination assures none is necessary.  These 
UA pilot actions are analogous to those that 
would be taken by the pilot of a manned aircraft 
in visual meteorological conditions (VMC) who 
would see (i.e., detect and track) proximate 
aircraft, determine if they (will) possibly 
conflict with the current flight path, coordinate 
as needed with ATC if receiving services, and 
then maneuver (or not) as necessary to remain 
well clear and resolve the conflict if it exists.  
Similarly, the UA pilot may use the displayed 
data to identify and follow, or maneuver relative 
to, traffic called out by ATC, at a safe distance 
as indicated by the TD&R capability, in an 
analogous manner to a pilot of a manned aircraft 
visually performing these functions. 
In situations where the UA-GCS link is 
assumed to be lost (e.g., link heartbeat timers 
have exceeded defined thresholds), the UA may 
take autonomous action to remain well clear of 
threats identified by the TD&R capability to 
have violated a defined self-separation 
threshold. The autonomous self-separation 
threshold may be different than the self-
separation threshold used when the link is still 
functional.  This UA behavior is analogous to a 
manned-aircraft pilot in VMC who has lost 
communication with an air traffic service 
provider, but continues to remain clear of other 
detected traffic.  Similarly, if the UA’s SAA 
capability includes collision avoidance (which it 
may or may not have, as described previously) 
and the computed time-to-collision falls below a 
defined threshold, then the UA may 
autonomously maneuver to avoid collision, 
regardless of lost-link status.  These actions are 
analogous to the last-moment maneuvers that a 
pilot of a manned aircraft would take to avoid 
collision with an intruder. 
3   SAA Concept Extended 
A key element of the concept development 
approach is to understand the design space for 
SAA interoperability. This can be accomplished 
by starting with the assumption that completely 
accurate and reliable surveillance data are 
available to the TD&R logic of the SAA system. 
This assumption allows for the determination of 
practical separation and alert-time minima and 
maxima for optimal interoperability with the 
airspace system, independent of surveillance 
performance.  
Concept implementations will subsequently 
have to account for real-world surveillance data 
uncertainty and sensor performance, informed 
by the interoperability concept of the 
operational design space available, and by 
safety analyses of the required sensor 
performance to operate within this design space 
to a specified target level of safety. 
SAA concepts and their implementations must 
address at least three questions: 
 What proximate traffic situations may 
require a change to the current 
M. Consiglio, J. Chamberlain 
6 
trajectory, or modification of a new 
trajectory under consideration? 
 When should such a possible change be 
declared to the pilot? 
 What trajectory changes are acceptable? 
Each of these questions is addressed in the 
following subsections; the first question is 
closely related to the issue of “well clear.” 
3.1 “Well Clear” 
The regulatory requirement to remain well clear 
of other aircraft is most directly addressed in 14 
CFR 91.113 (b) which states, “When weather 
conditions permit, regardless of whether an 
operation is conducted under instrument flight 
rules or visual flight rules, vigilance shall be 
maintained by each person operating an aircraft 
so as to see and avoid other aircraft.  When a 
rule of this section gives another aircraft the 
right of way, the pilot shall give way to that 
aircraft and may not pass over, under or ahead 
of it unless well clear.”  If a UA is projected to 
be less than well clear from an intruder for 
which it should yield right of way, either on its 
current trajectory or on a new trajectory under 
consideration, then the SS function must detect 
this condition.  The challenge is to determine 
what is well clear. 
There is no precise regulatory definition of 
well clear, but at a minimum it should provide 
enough separation to avoid collisions.  
Specifically, 14 CFR 91.111 (a) states that “no 
person may operate an aircraft so close to 
another aircraft as to create a collision hazard.”  
The SAA Workshop Report considers aircraft to 
be well clear if they remain outside of each 
others’ respective collision avoidance thresholds 
(i.e., prevent activation of their collision 
avoidance functions), but while necessary this 
does not seem a sufficient condition to be well 
clear.  For example, consider one co-altitude 
aircraft crossing just in front of another (Fig. 3) 
and missing by 501 feet (that is, passing just 
outside the CV). 
A hypothetical CA function with perfect 
surveillance data and trajectory calculations 
would not necessarily activate, since it would 
calculate that technically an NMAC will not 
occur (i.e., the intruder trajectory would remain 
outside the CAT).  By the workshop definition 
these crossing aircraft would be well clear, even 
though at CPA they would be less than a second 
apart if each was traveling at 600 knots!  The 
condition is also difficult to specify in abstract 
terms: if the UA’s SAA capability does not 
include a CA function then there is no CAT 
defined for which the SS function should remain 
outside. Additionally, the SS function has no 
knowledge of the intruder’s CA function, if any, 
and thus no defined way to prevent its 
activation.  The Workshop Report recognizes 
this last issue as a challenge and states that the 
SS function should calculate well clear so as not 
to initiate a CA maneuver by either the UA or 
the intruder, but does not provide a mechanism 
for doing so. 
 
To address the aforementioned difficulties, 
the  concept described here requires that a well 
clear determination is large enough to avoid: 1) 
corrective resolution advisories (RAs) for 
Traffic Alert and Collision Avoidance System 
(TCAS) II Version 7 (or higher) equipped 
intruders; 2) undue concern for proximate see 
and avoid pilots; and 3) traffic alert issuances by 
controllers.  Each of these well clear 
requirements will be further described in 
subsequent subsections, but most importantly 
they all indicate the need for a “self separation 
volume” (SSV), larger than the CV and 
designed to provide a minimum practical 
separation distance between the UA and any 
intruder as shown in Fig 4.  The SSV size will 
vary with operational area and needs – smaller 
in the vicinity of airports and larger in en route 
airspace – but in all cases should be sufficient to 
 
Fig. 3. No NMAC but also not Well Clear! 
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compensate for unexpected maneuvers by 
intruders as well as to provide a well clear 
“comfort factor” for pilots and controllers. 
 
The SSV’s significance for SS function 
design is analogous to the CV’s significance for 
CA function design: it provides a performance 
goal. That is, an ideal SS function would 
prevent all SSV incursions just as an ideal CA 
function would prevent all CV incursions. 
Occasional SSV incursions will inevitably occur 
with SS implementations in actual operations 
and the SS implementation should recognize 
such cases and provide guidance for optimally 
recovering from the SSV incursion. Safety 
analyses will ultimately determine acceptable 
SSV incursion rates and inform the selection of 
SS design parameters (sensor performance, 
activation thresholds, maneuver selection, etc.) 
necessary to sufficiently detect and avoid SSV 
incursions, in the same way that similar safety 
analyses have informed the design of CA 
functions such as TCAS. 
3.1.1 TCAS Interoperability 
It is highly desirable that SAA implementations 
be designed in a way that minimizes issuance of 
corrective RAs by TCAS equipped intruders. 
RAs are alerts with recommended vertical 
escape maneuvers, to maintain or increase 
vertical separation with intruders that are 
collision threats. Corrective RAs that cause 
evasive maneuvers are disruptive to the air 
traffic system and are intended as a last resort 
maneuver when all other means of separation 
have failed. TCAS uses various mechanisms for 
collision avoidance that have implications for 
the appropriate sizing of the SSV. 
The SAA concept described in this paper is 
designed to detect encounter geometries that 
will cause an RA [5], so that action may be 
taken early enough to avoid the RA.  
Determination of these encounter geometries 
requires a more detailed understanding of TCAS 
operations and functions; this subsection 
provides a description of TCAS collision 
avoidance logic and subsequently describes well 
clear requirements for compatibility with TCAS 
operations. 
TCAS is a family of airborne devices that 
are designed to reduce the risk of mid-air 
collisions between aircraft with operating 
transponders [6]. TCAS II provides RAs and is 
mandated in the U.S. for aircraft with greater 
than 30 seats or a maximum takeoff weight 
greater than 33,000 pounds, and is also installed 
on many turbine-powered general aviation 
aircraft. TCAS has evolved through extensive 
development and a number of versions since its 
initial operational evaluation in 1982; Version 
7.0 is the current operationally mandated 
version of TCAS II, and Version 7.1 has been 
fully specified [7]. 
TCAS uses the concept of tau (τ), defined 
as range over the negative of range rate (i.e., 
closure rate), or τ ꞊ −r/ṙ, to estimate the time to 
closest point of approach (CPA) between the 
own aircraft and an intruder.  Both range and 
range rate are derived from TCAS 
interrogations of the intruder’s transponder, 
nominally at one-second intervals when the 
intruder’s range and tau are below specific 
threshold values. 
Tau is the actual time to CPA only when 
the aircraft are on collision courses and not 
accelerating (tau will be zero at collision). If the 
aircraft will merely pass near each other then tau 
is only an approximation of time to CPA. In this 
case, tau will decrease to a minimum value 
shortly before actual CPA and then increase. 
Since the ratio of range and range rate will be 
lower with closer approaches, this minimum 
value of tau varies directly with the nearness of 
the encounter. 
 
 
Fig. 4. Self-Separation Volume (SSV) 
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This property of tau means that selection of 
a minimum tau value at which to alert for a 
collision threat determines not only the time to 
react to the threat, but also the size of protected 
airspace within which a given threat encounter 
will cause an alert. TCAS computes both a 
range-based tau, as described above, and also a 
“vertical” tau (altitude separation divided by 
vertical closure rate) to estimate time to co-
altitude. 
Effective TCAS logic requires a tradeoff 
between necessary protection and unnecessary 
advisories [6].  This tradeoff is accomplished by 
controlling the sensitivity level (SL), which 
among other things controls the tau thresholds 
for RA issuance, and therefore the dimensions 
of protected airspace around each TCAS-
equipped aircraft. The higher the SL, the larger 
the amount of protected airspace and the longer  
the alerting times, with SL selection generally 
controlled by the aircraft’s altitude (higher SL 
for higher altitudes, where generally speeds are 
higher and separations are larger). 
Table 1 (at the end of the paper) shows the 
altitude bands for each SL and the associated 
(range and vertical) tau thresholds for RA 
issuance (values are also shown for TA 
issuance, which are not discussed here). For 
example, when a TCAS-equipped aircraft is 
between 20000 and 42000 feet (SL 7), the tau 
threshold for RA issuance is 35 seconds, and 
generally an RA will be issued if both range and 
vertical tau fall below this value. An RA will 
also be issued for low vertical rate encounters if 
the current altitude difference is less than the 
vertical threshold (ZTHR) value of 700 feet. 
Once TCAS determines that an RA is 
required then it must determine the type of RA 
needed. In order to do this, TCAS estimates the 
altitude difference at CPA for various RA types; 
if the altitude difference will be less than the 
ALIM value (600 feet in this example) then the 
RA will be corrective (e.g., “Climb” if level), 
requiring a trajectory change to regain at least 
ALIM feet of vertical separation; otherwise the 
RA will be preventive (e.g., “Don’t Descend” if 
level), requiring no trajectory change. 
Two problems arise with use of the simple 
definition of range tau (τ ꞊ −r/ṙ).  The first 
problem involves threat encounters with low 
range closure rates, and the second problem 
involves high closure rates with large miss 
distances.  To address these problems, TCAS 
employs modifications to the definition, and 
these modifications are instructive for SAA’s 
well clear challenge and for the determination of 
TCAS-compatible SSV sizes. 
Fig. 5 illustrates these two problems.  The 
figure shows four co-altitude intruders with 
various encounter geometries, but all at an RA-
threshold tau (for SL 7) of 35 seconds from the 
own aircraft.  Intruder A is a head-on collision 
encounter with a 1200-knot closure rate, 
resulting in an RA-threshold tau at a large range 
(11.7 nmi).  Intruders B and C illustrate the low-
closure-rate problem: the ranges are only 0.1 
and 0.3 nmi, respectively, before the RA-
threshold tau value is reached.  If either intruder 
accelerates (in the general sense, including 
turns) there will be little or no collision 
protection.  Intruder D’s parallel fly-by 
encounter illustrates the high-closure-rate 
problem: a “nuisance” RA will be issued even 
with a horizontal miss distance of nearly 6 nmi 
because of the high closure rate. 
TCAS addresses the low-closure rate 
problem by using a modified tau definition [7]: 
 
      
 
  
 
DMOD is a distance modification that 
varies with sensitivity level (see Table 1) and 
was designed to provide approximately an RA-
threshold amount of  reaction time for an 
intruder that accelerated toward the own aircraft 
at a sustained 1/3 g [8]. Modified tau values are 
 
Fig. 5.  Intruders at Tau=35 seconds 
 
 9  
CONCEPT OF INTEGRATION FOR UAS OPERATIONS IN THE NAS 
nearly identical to “true” tau at large ranges and 
range rates but are smaller (more conservative) 
for smaller ranges and rates, and will be zero if 
an intruder is within a distance of DMOD from 
the own aircraft, even with no closure rate. 
TCAS Versions 7.0 and higher address the 
high-closure-rate, nuisance-RA problem by 
employing a horizontal miss distance (HMD) 
filter [9].  The HMD filter employs a parabolic 
range tracker to provide projected range 
acceleration as well as projected range and 
range rate, and uses the range acceleration to 
detect horizontal miss distances that are 
sufficiently large as to not be a collision threat 
(range acceleration will be zero for non-
accelerating aircraft on a collision course, but 
will monotonically increase if the encounter has 
a miss distance).  The HMD filter employs 
numerous noise filters and maneuver checks 
whose explanations are beyond the scope of this 
paper, but the end result is that the filter will 
suppress RA issuances for horizontal miss 
distances at CPA that are approximately equal 
to the DMOD values. 
TCAS’s use of modified tau and the HMD 
filter has implications for defining minimum 
acceptable sizes for the SSV.  That is, the lower 
lateral and vertical limits for a TCAS-
compatible SSV size are approximately the 
DMOD and ALIM values in Table 1, 
respectively (exact values are contained in the 
pseudocode volume of [7]).  Encounter 
geometries that would result in an intruder 
entering this SSV will cause issuance of a 
corrective RA, because the HMD filter will not 
suppress RA issuance and also because 
modified tau will eventually drop below the 
threshold value (and will be zero when the 
intruder is within this SSV). Conversely, if the 
aircraft are not maneuvering toward each other 
(as defined by the HMD maneuver checks) then 
encounter geometries that will clear the SSV as 
defined here should not cause RA issuance. 
3.1.2 See and Avoid Pilot Expectations 
Determining minimum well clear requirements 
that meet see and avoid pilots’ expectations is 
not straightforward. The determination is 
subjective and pilot-specific, and may even be 
different for UA and manned aircraft intruders.  
That is, an encounter geometry that a pilot 
would consider “well clear” if the intruder is a 
manned aircraft might be judged as “too close” 
by the same pilot if the intruder is a UA. 
Human-in-the-loop (HITL) studies are needed 
to further inform such subjective assessments, 
but lacking such studies some general 
observations can still be made. It should be 
noted that these observations are focused only 
on pilots’ perceptions of what is well clear when 
an intruder (such as a UA) passes ahead, across, 
over, under or abeam their flight path, and not 
on perceptions of appropriate intruder following 
or pass-behind distances. Determination of these 
latter distances depends on numerous additional 
operational factors such as wake vortex 
avoidance, sufficient spacing for runway 
arrivals, etc. and is arguably a distinct, 
additional issue, involving informed judgment 
by the intruder pilot, than that of the well clear 
challenge. 
Except for formation flight, which is 
beyond the scope of this initial concept, pilots 
generally expect to have the least separation 
from airborne intruders in the immediate 
vicinity of airports, more separation in a 
terminal area, and the most separation in the en 
route environment. This expectation is 
consistent with the TCAS use of larger DMOD, 
HMD, ZTHR and ALIM values for higher 
altitudes, i.e., higher SL, and in fact these values 
may serve as a starting guideline for pilot 
minimum well-clear expectations during 
transitory (non-following) encounters. The 
DMOD/HMD values vary from 0.2 nmi below 
2350 feet AGL (i.e., typical of operations near 
an airport) to 1.1 nmi above 20000 feet MSL 
(typical of en route operations) with values of 
0.35-0.8 nmi in between (0.35 nmi below 5000 
feet, typical of terminal operations). ALIM 
values are 300-400 feet below 20000 feet MSL 
(pressure altitude) and 600-700 feet above this 
level, which is compatible with the vertical 
separations of 500 and 1000 feet in use below 
and above Flight Level 180, respectively, and 
are set slightly smaller than the vertical 
separation values to minimize disruptive 
“nuisance” RA maneuvers. 
The airport operational encounter geometry 
with both the closest expected lateral spacing 
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and a high closure rate would likely occur 
during simultaneous opposite-direction 
operations to parallel runways; controllers can 
approve such operations in daylight visual 
conditions when the runway centerlines are as 
close as 1400 feet (slightly over 0.2 nmi) apart 
([4], Section 3.8.4). A more typical close-range, 
high-speed traffic pattern encounter would 
occur with one aircraft on an extended 
downwind leg and the other on final approach; 
these may result in fly-by encounters of as close 
to one-half mile without undue concern by the 
pilots, who understand the structure of the 
encounter, although generally the spacing is a 
mile or more. Low-closure-rate operational 
encounters can be much closer with same-
direction parallel runway operations; controllers 
can approve these operations with runway 
centerline separations of as little as 300-700 
feet, depending on the aircraft category, 
although typically the aircraft are also staggered 
longitudinally for increased separation. Such 
small separations, if the aircraft are abeam on 
approach, are less than the DMOD RA 
threshold when above 1000 feet AGL (RA 
issuance is suppressed below 1000 feet AGL), 
and may be too small for “comfort factor” use 
by SAA-equipped UAs in mixed operations. 
Well clear distances that are acceptable to 
pilots in in the airport vicinity would generally 
be smaller than in terminal airspace and in turn 
those would be smaller than acceptable 
distances in en route airspace. This is partly due 
to the progressively higher “surprise” factor of 
encountering a proximate aircraft in these 
regions and also the visual impact of higher 
encounter speeds. Often the encounters involve 
crossing geometries, which can add to the 
perceived need for more separation. As with 
airport-vicinity operations, the TCAS RA 
DMOD/HMD values may serve as a starting 
guideline for pilot lateral well-clear minimum 
expectations, but HITL studies are needed to 
determine average “comfort factor” minimums, 
which are likely somewhat larger based on an 
informal sampling of a few pilot subject matter 
experts. 
3.1.3 Controller expectations 
Air traffic controllers’ expectations for 
minimum safe distances between visually 
separated aircraft also have a subjective 
component, as they do for pilots, and can be 
informed by HITL studies; such studies are 
planned within the next two years by NASA’s 
UAS in the NAS project and results will be 
reported in future publications. In addition to 
their subjective expectations of minimum safe 
visual separations, controllers are also equipped 
with a variety of conflict alert tools [4] to detect 
and alert for encounters with potentially unsafe 
separation between visually-separated aircraft. 
Work is underway within the project to quantify 
minimum SSV sizes that will avoid issuance of 
these alerts. 
Unlike pilots, controllers also have 
expectations for maximum well clear distances. 
That is, pilots are generally unconcerned by an 
intruder that avoids them by an excessively 
large distance, unless it personally delays them, 
but for a controller such actions have the 
potential to disrupt overall traffic flow. For 
example, an en route aircraft that deviates a mile 
from an airway centerline to avoid traffic with 
or even without a prior request to ATC is 
unlikely to cause concern to the controller, but a 
five-mile deviation would most certainly get the 
controller’s attention. These expectations, in 
both en route and terminal airspace, will also be 
informed by the HITL studies planned by the 
project. Controllers also have expectations for 
visual following distances, since it directly 
impacts the efficiency of visual separation 
operations, and HITL studies can shed light on 
these expectations as well. 
3.2 Declaration Times 
As discussed in the previous subsection, SAA 
implementations must detect projected losses of 
well clear distances with intruders, but they 
must also determine when to declare that some 
action may be necessary to avoid these losses. A 
simple answer might be, “declare as soon as a 
projected (future) loss of well clear separation is 
detected,” but if surveillance capability enables 
intruders to be detected at large ranges then 
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such immediate declarations may cause frequent 
nuisance alerts and be inappropriate. 
Conversely, very limited surveillance range may 
provide too little declaration time to 
successfully avoid a loss of well clear separation 
or issuance of a TCAS RA. From a concept 
perspective, the declaration times should be at 
least large enough to avoid TCAS corrective 
RAs and to allow time for pilot reaction, ATC 
queries and execution of normal operational 
maneuvers to avoid SSV incursions, but small 
enough to avoid nuisance queries. Determining 
appropriate declaration times will both enhance 
SAA interoperability and inform sensor range 
requirements. 
One approach to determining appropriate 
declaration times is to observe the steps that a 
see-and-avoid capable pilot would take in the 
presence of an intruder, and to construct a “time 
budget” required to complete each of these steps 
(which are analogous to SAA sub-functions). 
The time budget can then be used to determine 
appropriate declaration times.  For example, the 
pilot of a manned aircraft would initially see 
(detect) an intruder, observe it for a short time 
to ascertain its relative track, and then evaluate 
that track for any projected loss of well clear 
separation. If the pilot decides that well clear 
separation may be lost at some future time, but 
the intruder is still a long distance away or has a 
small closure rate, then the pilot is likely to 
continue to track and evaluate the intruder (for 
example, to see if it changes direction or 
altitude), but at some point will decide (declare) 
that some action may be necessary, determine 
what action (if any) to take, and command and 
execute the action. The total time required 
between deciding that some action may be 
necessary and completing the execution of an 
avoidance maneuver that will miss the SSV is 
the declaration time. 
The declaration time will be influenced by 
many factors and in general will not be a fixed 
time. If the aircraft is receiving air traffic 
services then one of the factors is the allowance 
of sufficient time for the pilot to query ATC 
about the situation. If the controller knows the 
intruder’s intent and can advise the pilot that no 
separation loss will occur, then no action will be 
required; if the controller has no knowledge of 
intent then the pilot must determine and 
negotiate an appropriate action, and time must 
be allowed for this factor. Once an action is 
determined it must then be commanded through 
avionics over a control link, which raises 
another time factor particular to UAS. 
Executing the commanded avoidance maneuver 
is an additional time factor that will vary 
significantly with encounter geometry and 
aircraft maneuver performance. 
Quantifying each of these time factors will 
require further studies which are ongoing within 
the project. For example, batch simulations are 
being conducted using the Prototyping Aircraft-
Interaction Research Simulation (PAIRS) 
aircraft performance evaluation application [10, 
11] to determine required distances and 
execution times for various aircraft encounter 
geometries, maneuvers, miss distances and UAS 
performance characteristics. HITL studies will 
also be performed to assess controller 
perceptions of appropriate declaration times, 
and to evaluate concepts and procedures for late 
detection of intruders. 
3.3 Acceptable Trajectory Changes 
SAA implementations which appropriately 
detect and declare projected losses of well clear 
distances should also assist the UA pilot with 
determining appropriate action after the 
declaration. Under the concept described in this 
paper the UA pilot has similar pilot-in-
command authority as the pilot of a manned 
aircraft, and is responsible for safely 
maneuvering the UA consistent with right-of-
way rules and other applicable aviation 
regulations, but will not have the same 
immersive visual cues as a see-and-avoid pilot. 
SAA implementations can aid the pilot by 
displaying appropriate information elements 
from proximate traffic and encounters, although 
use of a conventional traffic display for 
maneuvering and collision avoidance poses 
many challenges [12]. In general much 
development, simulation and validation work 
remains in order to develop safe and effective 
displays for use in maneuvering relative to 
proximate traffic. 
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One decision aid which may be useful for 
maneuvering relative to proximate traffic is the 
use of “maneuver bands” [13,14] with a UA’s 
traffic display and primary flight 
instrumentation. Maneuver bands are computed 
by the SAA implementation’s TD&R capability 
and show tracks/headings, airspeeds and vertical 
speeds that will (or will not) result in loss of 
well clear distance with identified intruder(s) 
within the declaration time. The TD&R 
capability computes and regularly updates the 
bands with knowledge of the UA’s standard 
maneuvering rates (of turn, climb, etc.) in the 
current flight environment, so that the UA’s 
performance into or out of a given band is taken 
into account.  The bands provide three decision 
aiding functions to the pilot: 1) a well-clear 
threat “declaration,” when a band moves over 
the UA’s current track, airspeed or vertical 
speed; 2) a situation rate-of-change, indicated to 
the pilot by the rate at which the bands change; 
and 3) a planning tool, by showing tracks, 
airspeeds and vertical speeds which can be 
commanded without projected loss of well clear 
distances within the declaration time. 
Special consideration must be given to 
appropriate maneuvers when late detection of an 
intruder occurs (i.e., within the declaration 
time). A pilot capable of see and avoid is likely 
to respond to a late detection in one or more 
ways, depending on the time and equipment 
available: 1) maneuver first and then inform 
ATC; 2) maneuver in a more aggressive way, up 
to a maximum operational rate; and/or 3) 
respond to a TCAS corrective RA if so 
equipped and the RA is issued. These responses 
should also be available to a UA pilot, but 
optimal means for conveying the urgency of the 
situation to the pilot, relative to which of these 
responses are appropriate, are still under 
development. A principle of the concept is that, 
if detection occurs too late to avoid penetration 
of the SSV, the TD&R capability will continue 
to provide guidance to clear the SSV, but do so 
in a manner that is TCAS-compatible. That is, 
once an RA threshold is crossed, the TD&R 
capability will either “freeze” vertical guidance 
at the current altitude or rate while continuing to 
indicate lateral escape tracks, or it will 
relinquish vertical guidance to the TCAS II 
logic (and its active-coordination vertical 
maneuver capability) if TCAS use for UAS is 
approved in the future and the UA is so 
equipped. 
A final consideration concerns acceptable 
SAA trajectory changes when the control link to 
the UA is lost. In this case the UA might have 
on-board capability to command TD&R-
compatible maneuvers in order to remain well 
clear of proximate aircraft, but such automated 
UA operations raise many conceptual issues 
which are yet to be fully articulated, explored 
and resolved. From an interoperability 
perspective, one approach might be to 
autonomously maneuver for an intruder at the 
declaration time minus the time budget 
allocated for UA pilot query and negotiation 
with ATC; that is, the automation would delay 
maneuvering to the minimum time where a 
well-clear distance could still be maintained 
with normal operational maneuvering. This 
approach might minimize autonomous 
maneuvering that is disruptive to ATC and 
proximate see and avoid and/or TCAS-equipped 
aircraft, but many other questions inevitably 
remain unanswered when attempting to replace 
a pilot’s decision authority with automation. 
4. Conclusions 
UAS will need a means to replace an onboard 
pilots’ ability to see and avoid other traffic, and 
the SAA systems that are expected to provide 
these means will need to do so in a manner that 
preserves the safety level of the airspace and the 
efficiency of the air traffic system. The SAA 
concept for integration of UAS into the NAS 
described in this paper is based on 
interoperability principles that take into account 
both the ATC environment as well as existing 
collision avoidance systems such as TCAS. 
Specifically, the concept addresses the 
determination of well clear values that are large 
enough to avoid issuance of TCAS corrective 
RAs, undue concern by pilots of proximate 
aircraft and issuance of controller traffic alerts. 
The concept also addresses appropriate 
declaration times for projected losses of well 
clear conditions and maneuvers to regain well 
clear separation. NASA is currently 
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implementing the concept in simulation for 
evaluation and to further inform appropriate 
well clear and declaration time values. 
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